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I Introduction 
 
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss with you how competition law regulates the 
conduct of universities. Universities supply a range of services to students. These include 
most obviously, tuition services in relation to undergraduate and postgraduate courses; 
research supervision services in relation to research degrees; as well as consultancy services 
in relation to Government and industry work. For the purposes of the CCA, universities are 
trading corporations. They engage in trade or commerce through the provision of a range of 
services for reward. 
 
As such Universities are subject to the same rules and regulations that govern the conduct 
of other trading corporations, such Coles and Woolworths. As senior officers and managers 
of a trading corporation you need to acquire some basic understanding of the rules that 
govern competition in the education sector. In other sectors, companies generally 
undertake a risk assessment of those areas where they are most at risk of contravening the 
CCA; to ascertain in advance how problems might arise so that they can put in place 
strategies to mitigate the risk of inadvertent contraventions. 
  
Professional associations like Universities Australia and the Australasian Association for 
Institutional Research (AAIR) play a useful role in enabling their members to meet and 
discuss sector-wide issues and to share information. However, their members are generally 
competitors and this means that the association and its members must take great care to 
ensure that they do not engage in anti-competitive conduct that may breach the provisions 
of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA).  
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The aim of the CCA is to make markets work better. It does this by regulating the conduct of 
suppliers and the way they interact with each other; and by regulating the way suppliers 
interact with consumers. On the supply side the aim of the CCA is to promote competition 
among suppliers and to prohibit conduct that lessens competition. Competition is a process 
of rivalry, or striving, to win sales and market share. Suppliers of educational services 
compete on the basis of price (tuition fees), and the quality of their programs and facilities. 
The markets in which they compete may be regional, State-based or national.  
 
Tuition fees for Commonwealth Supported students at Australian universities have been 
capped by the Government, although there have been a significant number of full-fee 
paying international, and fee paying domestic students. If the changes announced in the   
2014 Commonwealth Budget are enacted, the upper limit on fees for Commonwealth 
Supported university students will be removed. This is likely to result in a much greater 
degree of price competition among universities. 
 
Competition depends on independent decision-making by universities about tuition fees, 
which courses to offer, the content of the courses, and who will teach them. When 
university officers and managers from different institutions get together and agree amongst 
themselves what courses to offer and what tuition fees to charge, they will fall foul of the 
CCA.  My paper today is falls broadly into three parts. First, I will explain the nature of cartel 
conduct. Secondly, I will outline the sanctions that can be imposed for engaging in cartel 
conduct. Finally, I will provide some guidance on how to avoid becoming a party to a cartel. 
 
II What is a cartel? 
Cartel conduct takes a wide variety of forms – some cartel conduct is inadvertent and not 
very harmful in terms of its effect on consumers; other cartel conduct is deliberate and can 
result in consumers paying millions of dollars in higher prices. Division 1 of the CCA is 
drafted to reflect this range of culpability and provides for two sets of prohibitions that 
operate concurrently. They are: 
• cartel offences which are intended to catch deliberate and serious cartel conduct; and 
• civil prohibitions which are intended to catch inadvertent and less serious cartel 
conduct. 
Both sets of prohibitions separately prohibit making a contract, arrangement or 
understanding that contains a cartel provision and giving effect to a contract, arrangement 
or understanding that contains a cartel provision.  
The cartel offences and the civil prohibitions contain identically worded physical elements. 
However, the cartel offences also require proof of the relevant fault elements which are 
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“intention” in relation to creating the contract, arrangement or understanding, and 
“knowledge or belief” in relation to the requirement that the contract, arrangement or 
understanding contains a cartel provision.   
 
Contract, arrangement or understanding 
 
The first physical element that must be satisfied is the need for a contract, arrangement or 
understanding. The terms “arrangement” and “understanding” are not defined. Broadly, 
they require some form of communication between at least two parties, whereby one 
accepts a commitment, to do something. The commitment does not have to be a legally 
binding commitment; but it must be more than a mere expectation. There is no need for 
any element of mutual obligation or reciprocity, insofar as the other party or parties to the 
arrangement are concerned. 
 
Cartel provision 
 
The second physical element that must be satisfied is the need for a cartel provision. The 
term “cartel provision” is defined to catch four different types of conduct between 
horizontal competitors: 
 
• Price fixing 
• Market sharing 
• Output restrictions 
• Bid rigging or collusive tendering 
In this context, two parties to a contract, arrangement or understanding will be horizontal 
competitors if they are, or would be likely to be, in competition with each other but for the 
contract, arrangement or understanding. “Competition” for the purposes of the CCA 
embraces actual and potential competition. Insofar as one University’s course is regarded by 
students as a close substitute for another university’s equivalent course, both universities 
compete in the same market. For example, a university in the Group of Eight should not 
assume that it is not in competition with an ATN university, or one of the Innovative 
Research Universities, where all three universities operate in Brisbane and all three offer 
undergraduate courses in law that have been accredited by the Legal Practitioners 
Admission Board (Queensland) as a recognized qualification for admission as a legal 
practitioner in Queensland. 
 
Price fixing   
 
The first type of cartel provision is one that has the purpose or effect of price fixing. Price 
fixing includes any conduct that interferes with the independent determination of a price. In 
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most cases this will involve an agreement to increase price or to maintain existing prices, or 
not to compete on price, or not to grant discounts or rebates.  The definition of price fixing 
would also catch the adoption of a formula for calculating price.  
 
Discussions or exchange of data between competing universities about their future pricing 
intentions in relation to particular courses are likely to result in a contravention of the CCA. 
 
Scenario A 
 
AAIR members meet at a forum in 2014 before Universities publicly announce their 
fees or the principles behind the fee structure.  Members discuss the budget changes 
and the Government’s proposed 20% reduction in Commonwealth Grant Scheme 
funding, and the reduction in Research Training Scheme funding, for universities. 
Members discuss how to make up the shortfall and agree that they will recommend 
to their Vice Chancellors that they will increase fees for all courses by a minimum 
required to meet the shortfall.  
 
The purpose or effect of the provision is to fix the prices for services likely to be supplied by 
all of the parties to the arrangement. If each university decides independently to increase its 
fees by 20% this will not contravene the CCA. However, given the fact that university 
representatives have communicated with each other and if, following the meeting prices 
rise uniformly by 20 %, there is a risk that a court might draw an adverse inference that the 
price increase was made pursuant to an arrangement or understanding. 
 
Where the purpose or effect of an arrangement to share price information is to stabilise 
prices and reduce price variations, this may contravene the CCA.  Where the exchange of 
information is capable of removing the uncertainty about the intended conduct of the 
parties in the future it is likely to constitute price fixing. 
 
In 2006, 50 fee paying independent schools in the UK were fined for information sharing 
about prices, which infringed the equivalent UK competition rules. The matter was 
investigated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is the UK regulator responsible for 
enforcing competition law, in the same way that the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is responsible for enforcing the CCA. According to a report in The 
Guardian newspaper: 
The OFT investigation focused on fee rises between 2001 and 2004 and found 
that in each year, schools swapped details of their intended fees. Sevenoaks 
School in Kent then collated that information and circulated it, in the form of 
tables, to the schools concerned. The information in the tables was updated 
and circulated between four and six times each year as schools developed 
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their fee-increase proposals in the course of their annual budgetary 
processes. The investigation was reportedly started by a student who hacked 
into his school's financial records and leaked the documents to the press. 
Bursars have freely admitted that they used to meet regularly and talk about 
fees, but they maintain that this swapping of information did not amount to a 
concerted plot to push up fees.1 
In Australia, such an information sharing provision would have had the purpose or effect of 
fixing the prices for services likely to be supplied by all of the parties to the arrangement. 
 
Parallel prices not the result of collusion 
 
Universities may draw inferences based on the discussions at AAIR meetings and decide to 
follow the prices of a competitor. Where there are only a small number of competitors in a 
market and one obvious price leader, this may result in price uniformity. Economists have a 
number of different terms to describe this kind of behavior, including “conscious 
parallelism” and “oligopolistic interdependence”.  
 
According to a report in The Telegraph newspaper, the UK competition regulator is 
undertaking an investigation into UK universities after allegations of cartel conduct. The 
report: 
…raises concerns that universities, which nearly all charge £9,000 a year 
despite widely varying degree quality, are operating a cartel.  Figures last 
year showed that tuition time for physics students at different universities 
varied between 11 and 25 hours a week, with contact time for social studies 
students ranging from just nine hours to 16. However, last week vice-
chancellors denied any collusion. Steve Smith, vice-chancellor at the 
University of Exeter and chairman of the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service (UCAS) board, said: “Do universities collude on pricing? The answer is 
they do not. “If the government allowed universities to charge £10,000, they 
would all charge £10,000. 2 
                                                          
1 Matthew Taylor, Rob Evans and Rebecca Smithers  “Top 50 independent schools found guilty of price-fixing 
to push up fees” The Guardian, 11 November 2005. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/money/2005/nov/10/consumernews.publicschools 
2 Nicola Fifield, Price-fixing claims at British universities to be investigated by watchdog, The Telegraph,  23 
February 2014. 
Available at:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/10656408/Price-fixing-claims-at-
British-universities-to-be-investigated-by-watchdog.html 
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Provided that the decision to charge a particular price is made independently, and is not the 
subject of an arrangement or understanding, this is not illegal. The mere fact that 
Universities increase tuition fees to similar levels will not, of itself, be enough to constitute 
cartel conduct. 
 
Market sharing  
 
The second type of cartel provision is one that has the purpose of market sharing. Market 
sharing or market allocation occurs when corporations agree to divide the market by 
allocating customers or geographical areas to each other and agreeing not to poach 
customers (students) from the territories allocated to their competitors. 
 
Scenario B 
 
This scenario is taken from the University of Melbourne Compliance guide: 
 
The University enters into an agreement with a range of other Victorian universities 
who provide courses in the health sciences area that it will only recruit and enrol 
students from the metropolitan region. This is in order that regional universities will 
have a better chance of attracting regional students to its health science courses.3 
 
The purpose of this provision is to allocate between all of the parties to the arrangement 
the geographical areas in which services are supplied or are likely to be supplied. This sort of 
rationalisation may qualify for an authorisation. Authorisation is a formal process by which 
the ACCC is empowered to grant an exemption for conduct before it takes effect, if the 
applicants can demonstrate that it gives rise to a net public benefit.  That is, it gives rise to 
some public benefit (such as efficiency cost savings), that outweigh any public detriment 
arising from a lessening of competition. 
 
Output restriction 
 
The third type of cartel provision is one that has the purpose of output restriction. Output 
restrictions occur generally in situations of over-supply in a market which causes prices to 
fall. Suppliers agree to restrict the supply of the goods or services which will have the effect 
of increasing prices. Discussions or exchange of data between competing universities about 
their future intentions about the number of student places  they intend to offer are likely to 
result in a contravention of the CCA. 
                                                          
3 See University of Melbourne Compliance guide available at: 
https://www.unimelb.edu.au/compliance/misc/Trade%20Practices%20Act%20Compliance%20Guide.pdf 
See also the Compliance Manual of the University of Adelaide available at: 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legalandrisk/docs/resources/CCA_Manual.pdf 
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Scenario C 
Universities agree not to offer certain courses where those courses are also provided 
by other universities. For example, two universities are currently offering language 
courses in both Chinese and Japanese which are loss-making. Representatives of 
these institutions meet at a conference. They agree that the Brisbane demographic 
area will only support one provider of each language. University A agrees to provide 
only Chinese and University B agrees to provide only Japanese.  
 
The purpose of this provision is to restrict the supply or likely supply of services to persons 
or classes of persons. This sort of rationalisation may also qualify for an authorisation. 
 
Bid rigging or collusive tendering  
 
The fourth type of cartel provision is one that has the purpose of bid rigging. This requires 
little in the way of explanation and is likely to be deliberate rather than inadvertent conduct. 
 
Scenario C 
This scenario is taken from the University of Melbourne Compliance guide: 
 
The University enters into an agreement with several other leading research 
providers that it will not submit a tender for a government research contract relating 
to a particular area in which each of the research providers (including the University) 
has expertise. This is illegal under the new cartel provisions as it has the purposes of 
‘rigging’ the bid or tender process.4 
 
III What are the sanctions for engaging in cartel conduct? 
 
In my view there is a low risk that university staff would be caught engaging in any of these 
scenarios. The reason is that the kinds of decisions that are likely to attract liability are being 
made by a small group of senior managers within the particular institution. 
Even though the risk is low the consequences of a breach are so serious that great care 
needs to be taken to avoid an inadvertent breach. 
Individuals can be made liable on two different bases. First, where a corporation is primarily 
liable for a breach of a criminal offence or civil prohibition, an employee, servant or agent of 
the corporation may be liable as an accessory based on aiding, abetting, inducing, or being 
                                                          
4 See University of Melbourne Compliance guide available at: 
https://www.unimelb.edu.au/compliance/misc/Trade%20Practices%20Act%20Compliance%20Guide.pdf 
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knowingly concerned in the civil prohibition under the accessorial liability framework in s 79 
of the CCA.  
Secondly, individuals can be directly liable for a breach of the criminal offences in the 
Competition Code applied by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 in their State or 
Territory. Before taking criminal proceedings the CDPP will require evidence that the 
individuals concerned had the requisite knowledge or belief that the contract, arrangement 
or understanding contained a cartel provision. 
The fines and jails terms can be imposed on those convicted of committing a cartel offence.  
For corporations (universities) the maximum fines are $10 million per criminal offence or 
civil contravention; or three times the total value of the benefits obtained by one or more 
persons; or10% of the annual turnover pf the corporation in the preceding twelve months. 
For individuals who are found guilty of being involved in a contravention by a corporation, 
the sanction is imprisonment for up to 10 years and/or a fine up to 2,000 penalty units 
($340,000).  
 
Attempts 
 
The CCA provides for the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties for contraventions of the 
cartel laws is sweeping in its terms: it catches an attempt, inducing, and an attempt to 
induce a contravention. The CCA also creates a criminal offence where a person attempts to 
contravene the cartel offence provisions.  
For example, on 28 May 2014 the ACCC commenced civil proceedings for an alleged attempt 
to restrict the production of eggs against the Australian Egg Corporation Limited (AECL), its 
Managing Director, and two other AEC directors. The directors send emails to members 
suggesting that they meet to reduce the over-supply of eggs. The ACCC is concerned that 
the alleged attempt by the directors sought to obtain the agreement of egg producers to 
reduce supply. If successful it could have raised the price of eggs for consumers. 
Scenario E 
An AAIR member from South East Queensland gives a presentation at an AAIR 
conference about a range of possible prices that her institution may charge for a 
particular course, and what the implications will be in terms of student enrolments. 
Although she does not disclose which price her institution will charge for the course, 
she intimates that she will be recommending to her Vice Chancellor that her 
institution raise fees for its law course by 150%, because that is what she thinks the 
market will bear. Subsequently, when she sees that two of her competitors in South 
East Queensland have only increased the fees for their law courses by 50% she sends 
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them an email to arrange a meeting to discuss with them a possible fee increase for 
their law courses. 
The initial conduct, sometimes referred to as “signalling”, is unilateral conduct that does not 
result in an arrangement or understanding for the purposes of the CCA. It would not 
constitute an attempt to induce and arrangement containing a price fixing provision. 
However, her subsequent conduct in sending an email would constitute a step towards the 
making of an arrangement, which, if successful, would have increased the price of services 
supplied, by one or more of the parties to the arrangement. It is not necessary that the 
attempt must have reached an advanced stage before it comes within the attempt 
provisions; all that is required is the taking of a step towards the commission of a 
contravention. 
 
IV How do I avoid joining a cartel? 
 
Some universities provide guidance for their staff on the compliance obligations under the 
CCA.5 These compliance guides raise levels of awareness about what constitutes cartel 
conduct so that staff attending inter-institutional meetings, such as AAIR, do not 
inadvertently breach the CCA. Depending on the level of risk involved at the inter-
institutional meeting, where commercially sensitive information is being discussed, it may 
be prudent to have an independent legal adviser present. It is also advisable to keep formal 
records such as agendas and minutes of meetings recording what was discussed. This sort of 
evidence can be critical in rebutting any allegation of price fixing where price uniformity 
occurs following a meeting.  
 
Each institution must be able to demonstrate that it arrived at its course fees 
independently. The process adopted for arriving at course fees should be fully documented, 
and should be readily explicable in terms of prevailing market conditions. 
 
Information sharing 
 
The whole purpose of information exchange is to make markets more transparent and this 
will reduce uncertainty. Universities must not disclose commercially sensitive information 
which reduces uncertainty about their future commercial intentions. Much depends on the 
nature of the information exchanged, the level of detail and specificity of the information 
exchanged. The more detailed and specific the information – for example, talking about 
particular course offerings – the greater the risk of crossing the line that separates what is 
legal and what is illegal. 
 
                                                          
5 See University of Melbourne Compliance guide available at: 
https://www.unimelb.edu.au/compliance/misc/Trade%20Practices%20Act%20Compliance%20Guide.pdf 
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• This is no objection to sharing information that is publicly available. The information 
about where Universities are drawing their students is available through the Tertiary 
Admission Centre (TAC) for each state territory (QTAC for Queensland). From that 
information it is possible to determine demographic details for the students that 
other universities have admitted – by geography, school, gender, and age. 
• There is no objection to sharing information about past events so long as it does not 
provide a basis for predicting a future course of conduct. All discussions about future 
intentions, especially prices, must be avoided. 
• There is no objection to sharing aggregated data so long it is not possible to 
disaggregate it and attribute information to a particular institution. This may allow 
the parties to the information sharing arrangement to read into the data the likely 
future intentions of a competitor. 
 Record keeping 
 
When competitors meet to share information there is a risk that if prices rise following the 
meeting, the ACCC and the court may draw an adverse inference that it was pursuant to an 
arrangement or understanding reached at the meeting. In order to rebut such an inference 
being drawn it would be necessary to produce evidence of what was discussed at the 
meeting to convince the authorities that commercially sensitive information was not 
disclosed. 
 
Meetings should follow an agenda that has been circulated prior to the meeting. Minutes of 
the meeting should be taken and filed for future reference. If discussion strays away from 
the agenda into commercially sensitive areas the attendees should immediately terminate 
the discussion. If this is not possible they should leave the room and insist that their 
departure be recorded in the minutes. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
Competition in the university sector is not going away. On the contrary, you must expect it 
to become more intense. As you may be aware, on 27 March 2014, the Australian 
Government announced a wide-ranging review of Australia’s Competition Policy (the Harper 
Review). One of its key terms of reference is how to reform the Health and Education 
sectors and subject them to more competition. Any attempt by Universities to lessen 
competition is likely to be met with a swift response by the ACCC, especially any evidence of 
cartel conduct, which is a major enforcement priority of the ACCC. 
